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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀect of nonagricultural land use on agrarian organization
and land reform, providing a simple model to determine its policy implications and
some evidence on its importance. It is argued that, if land-rental market is imperfect,
there is a role for redistributive land policies and the following implications hold: (i)
land reform is more probable to enhance eﬃciency in a low-wage economy; (ii) such
policies should aim small farmers instead of landless people, obtaining land from
large landholders. Empirical evidence suggests this is a relevant issue in Brazil,
specially during periods of high macroeconomic instability.
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Land reform is a pervasive and controversial issue in Latin America. Economists
and policy makers usually associate the highly unequal pattern of land own-
ership to many aspects of economic development such as poverty, inequality,
eﬃciency, political power, racial conﬂicts and environmental strain. However,
after many years of trials, access to land remains an unsolved problem in most
of these countries.
Despite of some diﬀerences in implementation, land reform programs in Latin
America have a common feature of being embedded in an economic environ-
ment where market imperfections and policy distortions tend to set a wedge
between the price of land and the capitalized value of the income stream gen-
erated from agriculture. Land is used not only as an agricultural input but
also as a source of other beneﬁts - “as a hedge against inﬂation, as an asset
that can be liquidated to smooth consumption in the face of risk, as collateral
for access to loans, as a tax shelter, or as a means of laundering illicit funds”
[De Janvry, Key and Sadoulet (1997)]. Specially in countries characterized by
high macroeconomic instability (as in Latin America), people demand land as
a mechanism of protection against aggregate uncertainty.
This paper focus on the non-agricultural motive of landholding, providing a
theoretical model to address its policy implications and some evidence on
its relevance. The analytical framework is based on a model of occupational
choice under ﬁnancial constraints which emphasizes a speciﬁc mechanism for
the non-agricultural land use; namely, it focuses on the land as a safe device
for saving. Although this is the central mechanism of the model, which was
conveniently chosen because of the empirical test, qualitative results seem to
hold in a more general context.
The mechanics of the model is quite simple. It is considered an agrarian econ-
omy where peasants are heterogeneous in terms of initial wealth and farming
skills (they are equally productive as labourers). Even unskilled peasants, who
cannot manage agricultural production, might demand land as a safe device to
transfer wealth among periods of life. 1 If the land-rental market does not work
properly, those idle farmers keep their land unimproved, implying in a decrease
of the aggregate agricultural production and an ineﬃcient resource allocation.
This situation gives support to land reform programs and imposes some con-
ditions on the design of such policy. On the other hand, in an economy with
perfect land-rental market, unskilled farmers, who demand land simply as a
1 The structure of occupational choice, heterogeneity and credit constraint is
adapted from Assunção and Ghatak (2003). The diﬀerence here due to the fact
that land provides nonagricultural payoﬀs and, therefore, unskilled peasants de-
mand land even when they cannot undertake agricultural production.
2store of value, can lease out their land to be cultivated by skilled peasants, in-
creasing the overall agricultural output and establishing an eﬃcient resource
allocation. In other words, the land-rental market can establish an eﬃcient
resource allocation, even where people demand land for non-agricultural pur-
poses. Since land-rental markets in Latin America are relatively thin, 2 this
result suggest an interesting possibility for public policy that have not been
pursued.
The model yields two interesting predictions regarding the design of land re-
form programs. First, those policies are more likely to enhance eﬃciency in
low-wage economies because equilibrium responses of prices, wages and oc-
cupational choices might oﬀset initial eﬃciency gains of land redistribution.
This countervailing general equilibrium eﬀect does not occur in a low wage pre-
reform equilibrium. If land reform decreases the wage rate, there is a reduction
in the opportunity cost of becoming a farmer. As a result, new idle farms would
arise, outweighing the ﬁnal eﬀect. As suggested by Moene (1992), in a diﬀerent
context, this result imply that land reform is better in land scarce economies.
Second, land reform should aim small farmers instead of landless peasants
in order to improve eﬃciency. As long as occupational choice is endogenous,
agricultural workers may decide to stay in their previous job, selling the land
provided by the program for consumption. Another reason why small farmers
should be the target of such policies comes from a simple self-selection argu-
ment based on the fact that the farm size contains information about farmer’s
ability and land use.
The literature on land reform and agrarian organization is vast and cover
experiences from all over the world. 3 Although some authors have constructed
models that exhibit features oft-observed in Latin America to analyze agrarian
organization and land reform, such Conning (2001) and Conning and Robinson
(2001), most of the literature consider general aspects or case studies from
Asia. 4 A systematic analysis of the impact of the nonagricultural land use on
agrarian organization and land reform, which constitutes the objective of this
paper, however, was not pursued by the existing literature, notwithstanding
the recognition by many scholars of its importance.
2 According to the World Census of Agriculture, less than 5% of the agricultural
land is rented in Latin America. In Europe, it represents almost 25% of the total
area. In fact, aggregated indicators show that Latin American countries combine
a highly skewed distribution of land with the predominance of owner or ownerlike
form of land tenure, and agricultural land is mostly represented by meadows and
pastures, remaining under-exploited.
3 For comprehensive surveys see Binswanger and Deininger (1997), Carter and Ze-
garra (2000) and Deininger and Feder (2000).
4 See Grossman (1994) and Horowitz (1993) for political economy aspects of land
reform or the studies of land reform in India by Besley and Burgess (2000) and
Banerjee, Gertler and Ghatak (2002).
3The model also deﬁnes an empirical strategy for testing the existence of a
non-agricultural component of land demand through the comparison between
land prices and land-rental rates. In an economy with land-rental market, the
theoretical analysis shows that land prices can be expressed as a sum of two
terms - the land-rental rate and a term related to the non-agricultural land use.
Three approaches to test the existence of this additional component are used
in the paper. The ﬁrst one is based on the fact that exogenous macroeconomic
shocks are expected to aﬀect land prices and rental rates diﬀerently according
to the model. In the second approach, cointegration tests between time series
of land prices and land-rental rates are used to test the existence of a (non-
stationary) non-agricultural component of land demand. Finally, the third
one is based on the literature of testing the present value model of asset price,
following Campbell and Shiler (1987).
The empirical test is performed using data from Brazil, which is an interesing
case study for the purpose of this paper. Brazil has one of the most skewed
land distribution in the world. The Brazilian economy, in the period covered
by the data, is characterized by high inﬂation rates and many episodes of
high instability, and land reform has been on the policy agenda for a long
time. In one of the tests, the launching of a sequence of drastic measures
to contain the inﬂationary process during the 1980s and 1990s is explored
as a source of exogenous variation to the comparison between the responses
of detrended land prices and land-rental rates. Despite there is some careful
empirical studies regarding the eﬀects of land reform, little attention has been
giving to land use. The fact that the data used come from one country with a
long history of macroeconomic instability and the relatively long time period
allows some progress on this direction.
The results do not reject the hypothesis that land ownership provides non-
agricultural payoﬀs in Brazil. The announcement of the economic plans has
determined a current increase of 33% in land prices of cropland and an increase
of 41% in the subsequent period, both statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect on
land-rental rates, on the other hand, was insigniﬁcant in statistical terms,
which according to the model suggest that land is being used as a safe asset
during risky periods. Shocks seem to aﬀect the demand for land ownership
but not the demand for land leasing. For meadows and pastures, the response
from the rental rates is also signiﬁcant but much less important than the that
of land prices.
The cointegration analysis suggests the existence of this non-agricultural land
demand especially for meadows and pastures. For cropland, one cannot reject
that both series present a common trend. The exceptions are the Central-West
region (where the result is the opposite) and the North region (where the test
does not apply because both series are stationary).
4More evidence in this direction is given by the results from the Campbell
and Shiller’s methodology. The formal tests of the restrictions imposed by
the present value model of land price determination failed to support these
constraints and, therefore, the model itself for both pastures and cropland in
all regions. This result is in conformity with the empirical literature on the
determination of farmland prices. 5 Land prices are determined not only by
the present value of expected future cash ﬂows from agriculture but also by
other factors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents
the theoretical arguments about how the non-agricultural purpose of land-
holding is likely to aﬀect eﬃciency in economies with and without land-rental
market. Section 2 discusses the implications of the model for the design of
redistributive land reform programs. The empirical analysis is presented in
Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1B a s i c m o d e l
Consider an economy with an inﬁnite number of periods and overlapping gen-
erations of two-period-lived peasants. In each period, a large population with
mass normalized to 1 is born, with a time invariant and absolutely continu-
ous wealth distribution G(a). All individuals are sorted and named according
to their initial wealth - the peasant labeled 0 is the poorest and the peasant
labeled 1 the richest. Peasants devote their ﬁrst period of life to production
and the second one to consumption.
T h ek e yf e a t u r eo fo u rm o d e li st h a tl a n dp r o v i d e sn o n - a g r i c u l t u r a lp a y o ﬀst o
its owners. As pointed out by Berry and Cline (1979), “in countries with poorly
developed capital markets, especially those with chronic inﬂation, landowners
may ﬁnd it attractive to hold land for speculative gain - or merely to accom-
plish the store of value objective”. The model focuses on this issue assuming
that there is a monetary loss in the savings between the young and old ages
that occurs with probability π ∈ [0,1] prevented only by the holding of land
titles. The parameter π can be interpreted in diﬀerent ways - it can represent
the probability of stealing, the probability of a ﬁnancial crisis, or simply the
inﬂation rate.
Individuals have an endowment of 1 unit of labor which is supplied ineslasti-
cally, either in their own farm or working for someone else as an agricultural
laborer. Although the population is completely homogeneous with respect to
the ability to work, there is heterogeneity in farming skills. Only skilled peas-
5 See, for example, Falk (1991), Clark et al. (1993) and Goodwin et al. (2003).
5ants are able to undertake agricultural production, constituting active farms.
Unskilled farmers cannot produce, spending all their time endowment to as-
sure property rights of idle farms. 6 The distribution of skills is assumed to be
independent of the distribution of wealth. At each level of wealth, a fraction
α of individuals is skilled and the remaining fraction of 1 − α is unskilled.
The agricultural good, taken as numeráire, is produced by skilled farmers
and consumed by everybody. Skilled farmers can produce q units of output
per hectare using a ﬁxed-coeﬃcients production function which requires one
worker for every unit of land. The production takes one period to be done and
the inputs, land and labor, can be hired in competitive markets at prices p
and w, respectively. Whether a peasant is skilled or unskilled has no eﬀect on
his productivity as a worker and so the wage rate is uniform and, to simplify,
it is paid in the next period.
The dynamics of the economy is as follows. Each generation produces or works
when young and consumes when old. In a period t, young farmers spend their
wealth buying land from the old-aged farmers of previous generations and con-
tracting young workers to be paid in the second period. In the second period,
peasants receive their incomes (wages or agricultural proﬁts), sell their land
to youths of the next generation and spend their ﬁn a lw e a l t hi nc o n s u m p t i o n .
Initially, it is assumed there is no land-rental market 7 - section 1.3 examine
the consequences of openning a land-rental market for this economy. Unskilled
farmers cannot use their titles to prevent monetary loss and also lease-out their
land to skilled peasants for agricultural production. The only option for them
is to retain a portion of their wealth in the form of idle land.
Finally, in order to keep the analysis of occupational choices interesting, agents
cannot borrow to ﬁnance their land purchases. Hence, the access to land is
constrained by the initial wealth as in the literature of occupational choices
with ﬁnancial constraints (e.g. Banerjee and Newman, 1993; Galor and Zeira,
1993). Denoting the farm size by T,t h el a c ko fac r e d i tm a r k e ti m p l i e st h a t
pT ≤ a, for a peasant with initial wealth a.
Given the structure described above, the consumption of an agent born in
6 This is an assumption that simpliﬁes the presentation of our main results, and
it is reasonable for countries where the property right system is underdeveloped.
(Alston, Libecap and Mueller, 2002; De Soto, 2000)
7 Many arguments have been used to determine imperfections in land rental mar-
kets: risk sharing [Cheung (1969)], hidden actions and moral hazard [Stiglitz (1974);
Ghatak and Pandey (2000); Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)], screening [Hallagan (1978)
and Allen (1982)] and limited liability constraints [Shetty (1988); Laﬀont and Ma-
toussi (1995)].
6period t,i s :
ct+1 =

     
     
(1 − π)at + wt, if worker,
(1 − π)(at − ptTt)+pt+1Tt, if idle farmer,
(1 − π)(at − ptTt)+( q − wt + pt+1)Tt, if active farmer;
(1)
where at is the initial wealth, pt is the price of land and Tt is the farm size.
Notice that a proportion 1 − π of wealth that is not used for land purchasing
is lost. Young farmers buy land at price pt selling it in the next period at price
pt+1. In summary, landholding provides three kinds of potential beneﬁts: agri-
cultural proﬁts, protection against the monetary loss, and price appreciation.
Since G time-invariant, the rest of the paper will neglect the last one.
1.1 Occupational choices
The analysis of the occupational choices involves a comparison between con-
sumption proﬁles, given the land price and the wage rate. First, note that the
dynamics of the model is very simple, comprised of a simple sequence of static
decisions. Since the wealth distribution is time-invariant, only stationary equi-
libria are considered. Thereafter, it is assumed that pt+1 = pt = p and all time
indices are dropped. 8
Both idle and active farmers choose their farm size taking p as given. The ab-




. Since the ﬁnal consumption is a linear function of T in (1), they decide
either T =0(becoming workers) or the maximum size aﬀordable - T = a
p.
Equivalently, the labor demand for active farmers is equal to a
p because the
agricultural technology requires one worker for each hectare of land. Substi-
tuting the labor and land demands in (1), the ﬁnal consumption becomes
c =

      
      
(1 − π)a + w, if worker,






a, if active farmer.
(2)
The occupational choice follows from the comparison of consumption possibil-
ities in (2). Skilled peasants choose among all the three possible occupations,
8 The use of a dynamic model due simply to the necessity of building a meaningful
land market where the transactions occur between young peasants (buyers) and
old-aged peasants (sellers).
7becoming active farmers if, and only if,
q ≥ w and a ≥
wp
q − w + πp
≡ a1. (3)
If q ≥ w, active farms are more proﬁtable than idle farms, and every skilled
farmer undertakes the agricultural production. On the other hand, unskilled
peasants are limited in choice; they must become a worker or an idle farmer.





It is easy to see that a1 <a 2 if, and only if, q>w . The occupational choices
can be completely described by the initial wealth if q ≥ w as depicted in ﬁgure
1.
[Insert Figure 1]
Lemma 1.1 (Assunção and Ghatak, 2003) For every pair (w,p) such that
w ≤ q, idle farms are (weakly) larger than active farms on average.
Lemma 1.1 is a consequence of heterogeneity in farming skills coupled with
credit market imperfections. This result is especially interesting in the con-
text presented here because it implies that the farm size contains informa-







demand land only for agricultural production. A fraction 1−α of
large landowners, with T>a2
p , retain their holdings in the form of idle farms,
without agricultural production. Section 2 will examine the implications of
this result for the design of redistributive policies.
1.2 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the land market should equalize the aggregate demand
for land to the ﬁxed supply of land ¯ T. Conditions (3) and (4) determine
that skilled peasants with wealth greater than a1 and unskilled peasants with
wealth greater than a2 demand a
p hectares of land each one. Therefore, the








Equation (5) determines the total expenditure in land purchase is equal to the
value of the land endowment.
There is a subsistence activity which requires one unit of labor to generate a
payoﬀ of w without land. This is available to any individual. It is assumed
8that the agricultural technology strictly dominates the subsistence activity,
that is,
q>w . (6)
In order to simplify the notation, individuals in the subsistence sector will
be referred simply as workers with w = w. As a result, the equilibrium wage
rate belongs to the interval [w,q].I fw>q , the labor demand is zero because
nobody aspires to become active farmer, resulting in a decrease in w until
w ≤ q. However, if w<w , the labor supply is zero, since the subsistence
activity provides a better alternative.






adG(a) ≤ αG(a1)+( 1− α)G(a2), (7)
with the strict inequality holding only if w = w. The left-hand side of (7)
is the demand for labor while the right-hand side is the labor supply. Based
on the possible wages, it is useful to distinguish three possible cases: w = w,
w <w<qand w = q.
Case w = w : in equilibrium, an excess of supply in the labor market implies
that a positive portion of individuals engaging in the subsistence activity ex-
ists, and the equilibrium wage rate is w = w.T h et o t a ln u m b e ro fp e a s a n t s
in the subsistence activity is given by






Case w <w<q: in this case, nobody undertakes the subsistence activity
and (7) holds with equality.
Case w = q : nobody undertakes the subsistence activity and skilled indi-
viduals are indiﬀerent towards becoming active or idle farmers, resulting in
a1 = a2. It is a limiting case in which the fraction of land cultivated as active
farms is determined by the labor supply, and conditions (5) and (7) determine
that G(q/π)=α¯ T, which is compatible only with a particular conﬁguration
of the parameters of the model. 9 Af r a c t i o nα of the land is occupied by active
farmers employing all non-farmers workers.
These cases are determined by the endowments of the economy and the wealth
distribution. For example, given G, if the land endowment ¯ T is suﬃciently low,
only the equilibrium with w = w can prevail. On the other hand, if ¯ T>1
α,t h e
9 If ¯ T>
G(q/π)
α active farms and idle farms are equally proﬁtable, and the fraction
of active farms is smaller than α determined by the labor supply (which is equal to
G(q/π)).
9equilibrium wage rate is w = q. Therefore, this observation leads to a natural
interpretation of each possible equilibrium according to the abundance of land.
In order to evaluate the role of public policies, a notion of agricultural eﬃciency
based on the aggregate agricultural production is used. An allocation is said
to be eﬃcient if the associate aggregate agricultural production, Q, is equal
to the maximum possible value q ¯ T.
In the model, agricultural production is undertaken only by skilled peasants
with wealth greater than a1. Thus, the aggregate agricultural production is









Using (5), Q can also be expressed in terms of a2, in equilibrium, i.e.,









<q¯ T,( 8 )
where q ¯ T is the maximum aggregate agricultural production feasible.




ing in the minimum possible value for the aggregate agricultural production
Q = αq ¯ T.S i n c ea1 ≤ a2,i ti se a s yt os h o wf r o mF i g u r e1t h a tt h em i n i m a l
proportion of cropped land is α.
The equilibrium allocation is eﬃc i e n to n l yi ft h e r ea r en oi d l ef a r m e r s ,w h i c h
happens only if π =0 . The next proposition summarizes the agricultural
eﬃciency of agricultural production in the model discussed above.
Summary 1 In the absence of a land-rental market, the equilibrium is not
eﬃcient. Agricultural eﬃciency is attained, for any G,o n l yi fπ =0 .
The existence of a non-agriculture use of land, expressed by π>0,d e t e r m i n e s
a reduction in the agricultural production, since part of the land endowment
is retained as idle farms. Unskilled peasants demand land only to prevent
monetary losses. Since there is no land-rental market, those farms are kept
unimproved. On the other hand, if π =0 , all the land is used for agricultural
purposes and the maximum feasible production is achieved.
1.3 Openning a land-rental market
The land-rental markets might not work because of ﬁnancial constraints or
threats against property rights. In such situations there is a role for policy
interventions. In the case of ﬁnancial constraints, for example, measures as
10credit for land-rental can be used to overcome the problems related to ex ante
limited liability constraints [Laﬀont and Matoussi (1995)]. And when the prob-
lem is related to the threats of squatting by the tenant, measures to improve
tenure secure can used as an important instrument of land policy [Macours,
De Janvry and Sadoulet (2001)]. Despite many implementation issues that are
not taken into account, the following analysis suggests that improvements in
land-rental market should constitute a target to public policies. It is shown
that a land-rental market could establish an eﬃcient allocation of resources
even in the presence of non-agricultural purpose of landholding. Another result
from the openning of a land-rental market is the determination of an empirical
strategy for testing the existence of non-agricultural landholding.
In the perfect land-rental market case, decisions about farm size T and culti-
vated area A are disentangled. During youth, individuals decide land purchases
and land leases. Peasants whose cultivated area exceeds farm size have to pay
a rent to cover the diﬀerence A−T. On the other hand, young peasants with
idle land receive rents for the unused portion.
Let s denote the rental rate. Then, the consumption during the old-age in the
case of perfect land-rental market becomes
c =

     
     
(1 − π)a + w, if worker,
(1 − π)[a − pT − s(A − T)] + pT, if idle farmer,
(1 − π)[a − pT − s(A − T)] + pT +( q − w)A, if active farmer.
In each occupation, consumption is linear both in A and in T, which arises the
occurence of corner solutions. Analogously to the previous case, the absence
of a credit market implies that pT + s(A − T) ≤ a.
The following analysis considers only equilibria in which
q − w − (1 − π)s>π p+( 1− π)s. (9)
Otherwise, active farmers do not cultivate any area, a situation with no eco-
nomic interest. Under (9), active farmers choose T =0and A = a
s.I d l e
farmers, on the other hand, choose A =0and T = a
p−s. The analysis of
the no land-rental market case still applies and the new thresholds (levels





















sdG(a). The equilibrium condi-
















1 adG(a)=q ¯ T.
These ﬁndings can be summarized as follows.
Summary 2 In all equilibria with agricultural production (in which (9) holds),
a perfect land-rental market drives the economy towards an agricultural eﬃ-
cient equilibrium, even if π>0.
The existence of a perfect land-rental market makes the land property irrele-
vant for agricultural production, since there is no investiment 10 in the model
and peasants have complete access to land in a competitive rental market. All
available land is used for agricultural production, resulting in eﬃciency. As a
consequence of the linearity of the model, unskilled peasants own all available
land, which is rented out to and cultivated by skilled farmers.
Finally, the new equilibrium conditions can be arranged to generate an inter-
esting empirical strategy for testing the existence of a non-agricultural reason
























Eq. (12) shows that the land price p is the sum of two parts - a component
due to the demand of land for agricultural production and another component
related to a non-agricultural land use. The rental rate s, on the other hand,
is deﬁned only by the ﬁrst one. Eqs. (12) and (13) determine that
p = s + x, (14)
where x represents the value of the non-agricultural land use. Therefore, an
exogenous change in π aﬀects p and s diﬀerently, allowing the identiﬁcation
of the x component. This is the baseline of the empirical strategy of section 3.
Summary 3 In equilibrium, the price of land (for sale) can be written as
p = s+x,w h e r es is the rental rate and x is an additional component reﬂecting
10 For a recent analysis of the eﬀect of land tenure on investments, see Banerjee and
Ghatak (2003).
12the non-agricultural land use. The eﬀects of an exogenous change in π over p




2 Implications for land reform
Redistributive land policies have been adopted in many developing countries
in order to promote agricultural development. 11 This section examines the im-
plications of our model for the design of such policies. Diﬀerent policy targets
are evaluated considering the agricultural eﬃciency criteria of last section.
Initially, notice that ﬁgure 1 deﬁnes three diﬀerent classes of peasants:
• Agricultural workers / landless peasants: poor skilled peasants with
wealth below a1 a n du n s k i l l e dp e a s a n t sw i t hw e a l t hb e l o wa2. Individu-
als within this class do not have enough wealth to acquire an adequately
proﬁtable farm, preferring to employ themselves as workers.







landowners within this group are skilled peasants.
• Large landholders: farmers with plot size T>a2
p .Af r a c t i o nα of those
farmers is skilled and the remaing fraction 1−α of those farms are operated
by unskilled peasants.
Redistributive land policies in many countries has consisted of important land
tranfers from large landholders to landless people. Our model suggest that,
even if the ability of each potential beneﬁciary is perfectly observed such redis-
tribution may not lead to eﬃciency improvements. The long-run sustainability
of the new land distribution depends on what happens with the post-reform
wages.
Let us consider ﬁrst the case where the social planner can distinguish between
active and idle farms. Any transfer from idle farms to skilled farmers improves
the aggregate agricultural production. Once the agricultural technology faces
constant returns to scale the choice of the beneﬁc i a r i e si sd r i v e ns o l e l yb yt h e
initial wealth - all skilled farmers with a ≥ a1 are potential beneﬁciaries and
the farm size does not play any particular role.
All peasants with wealth strictly below a1 and unskilled peasants with wealth
strictly below a2 are choosing to become workers. As a result, marginal in-
creases of a for those peasants do not aﬀect their occupational choice. There-
fore, if the beneﬁciaries are landless they will sell the received plots for con-
sumption.
11 See Deininger and Feder (2000) for a survey.
13After the reform, the response from the new equilibrium wage rate may oﬀset
the initial eﬀects of the redistribution. A decrease in the post-reform wage
rate implies in a decrease in a1 and a2. In other words, the opportunity cost
of buying a farm decreases rising the demand for land. The reduction in a2
represents a higher demand of land for the store of value objective, oﬀsetting
the initial eﬀect of the land reform program. The price of land, on the other
hand, does not have any adverse eﬀect on eﬃciency, since the occupational
choice of unskilled peasants is independent of this variable.
Therefore, an ideal land reform should keep the initial wage rates unchanged
or even increase them. In the context of the model, it can be attained if
the land used in the program come from large idle farms. In this case, after
r e f o r mt h e r ei sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h el a b o rd e m a n dm u c hm o r es i g n i ﬁcant than
the increase in the labor supply, which raises the chance of a higher wage rate.
Obviously, in the case of a low wage rate equilibrium w = w a redistributive
policy from unskilled farmers to skilled farmers has an unambiguous eﬀect on
the agricultural production.
Consider now a situation in which the ability of each farmer is not observed.
As a consequence, policy instruments are restricted to be conditioned only on
the farm size, and transfers from unskilled peasants to skilled farmers are not
allowed. In this context, there are two selection problems on the implementa-
tion of redistributive policies: the choice of the beneﬁciaries and the land to
be conﬁscated or bought.
Our model has a partial solution for this problem, indicating that small farmes
should be the beneﬁciaries. Although the type of farmers is not directly ob-
served, it can be identiﬁed by the farm size. The previous sections has showed
that all farms with small plots, varying from a1
p to a2
p , are cropped. In order
to prevent a higher wage rate after reform, the previous observation about the
size of the farms to be conﬁscated/bought still holds. But now this procedure
will get unimproved land only with probability 1 − α.
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i si ss u m m a r i z e di nt h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n .
Summary 4 A redistributive land reform have the following properties:
• equilibrium responses to transfers targeting landless peasants might oﬀset
the initial eﬃciency gains;
• the eﬀects of the reform are sustainable if the pre-reform wage rate is w = w;
• if the pre-reform wage rate is w>wand the type of peasants is observed,
transfers from large unskilled landholders to skilled farmers are more likely
to enhance eﬃciency;
• if the type of peasants is unknown, transfers should aim small farmers to
increase the agricultural production.
143 Empirical evidence
This section explores the contents of equation (14) in order to evaluate the
existence of a non-agricultural purpose for landholding in Brazil. It is assumed
the following stochastic processes for pt and st:
pt = st + xt, (15)
and
st = ht + ut,
where ht is a (possibly non-stationary) random process describing the evolu-
tion of the agricultural market, xt is the term related to the nonagricultural
motive of landholding and ut is a white noise.
The empirical strategy is threefold. First, it is used the fact that π aﬀects
p through s and x. According to the previous model, exogenous shocks in π
determine diﬀerent responses in p and s.T h eﬁrst set of empirical results check
the existence of a component x through exogenous variations in π. The second
set of results examine the existence of a component x through a cointegration
test, based on the Stock and Watson (1988) representation of common trends.
If xt is nonstationary and not cointegrated with ht, it is possible to identify
it in a cointegration test. Finally, the strategy developed by Campbell and
Shiller (1987) to study stock market price movements is applied to formally
test the validity of the constant discount rate version of the present value
model of farmland prices.
3.1 Data description
The data used here consists of semestrial observations of land prices for sale
and rental covering the period from 1966 to 2000. It is collected by the Getúlio
Vargas Foundation, which gathers information from more than 3600 local
agencies scattered in many districts in Brazil. Observations refer to actual
transactions, collected within the districts at the end of each semester. There
is data on prices of meadows and cropland for the ﬁve Brazilian regions -
North, Northeast, Central-West, Southeast and South. 12
[Insert Table 1]
T a b l e1s h o w sas u m m a r yo fd e s c r i p t i v es t a t i s t i c sf o rt h ep r i c e so ft h ew h o l e
country. A simple comparison between the basic statistics of land prices for
12 All prices were deﬂated to 2000 level, using the IGP-DI (General Price Index
calculated by the Getúlio Vargas Foundation).
15sales and rentals reveals important diﬀerences. The prices of land for sale are
more volatile, more asymmetric and they have heavier tails for both meadows
and cropland. The coeﬃcient of variation of the sale’s price is 2-times (3-times)
bigger for the case of meadows (cropland). The skewness reﬂects the fact that
sharp increases in prices are much more frequent than decreases, as shown
in ﬁgures 2 and 3. As long as the recent Brazilian macroeconomic history
has experienced more variability than the Brazilian agriculture sector, those
results constitute a ﬁrst indication of the non-agricultural land use in Brazil.
[Insert Figure 2]
[Insert Figure 3]
3.2 Macroeconomic instabilities and land price
The ﬁrst empirical test is based on a sequence of policies adopted to contain
the inﬂationary process during the 1980s and 1990s. Those “heterodox” poli-
cies have resulted in unexpected (and exogenous, from the point of view of
agricultural producers) increases in the uncertainty of the economy, led by no-
tions concerning inertial inﬂation. The launching of the economic plans aimed
speciﬁcally at containing inﬂationary inertia through a set of measures includ-
ing the de-indexation of the economy, temporary price freezes, and a freeze
on ﬁnancial assets to reduce the economy’s liquidity and generate resources
for the budget. The uncertainty introduced into the economy by those drastic
measures generated a large shift in the demand for safe assets, including land.
The nonagricultural component of land demand is identiﬁed by comparing
the eﬀects of the launching of such policies on the land prices for sales and
rental. Two dummy variables were built - one indicating the launching of a
new economic plan in the current semester and another one related to the
institution of an economic plan in the previous semester. The following plans
are considered: Cruzado (february, 1986), Bresser (june, 1987), Summer Plan
(january, 1989), Collor (april, 1990) and Real (june, 1994).
Regressions for the whole Brazilian sample were estimated and reported in Ta-
ble 2. The dependent variables were detrended by using the Hodrick-Prescott
ﬁlter and centered around the original mean. Therefore, the intercept of each
regression can be interpreted as the averaged land price in the absence of new
economic plans at the current and previous semester. The coeﬃcients of the
dummy variables represent the average changes in prices at the lauching of
the economic plans and in the subsequent semester.
[Insert Table 2]
16Table 2 shows that the economic plans promoted signiﬁcant increases in land
prices for sales of both meadows and cropland in the current and next semester,
accounting for more than 15% of the total variability of these variables from
1966 to 2000. The eﬀects over rental rates are much smaller and statistically
insigniﬁcant for cropland. This suggest that the response of land prices for sale
to an exogenous increase on the macroeconomic instability is larger compared
with rental rates, which is consistent with the existence of a nonagricultural
purpose of landholding according to the theoretical model.
For meadows, the economic plans have determined an increase of almost 40%
in land prices of sales in the current semester and up to 50% in the next one.
The rental rates have experienced a much lower increase, around 20%. For
cropland, table 2 shows signiﬁcant increments only for land prices, both in
the current and subsequent semesters.The diﬀerence between meadows and
cropland might be a result of the demand for livestock as another source of
hedge.
3.3 A cointegration test
The second approach presented to identify nonagricultural land use follows
from a cointegration test. Based on the Stock and Watson (1988) represen-
tation for a cointegrated system, if pt and st are cointegrated they can be
described as a stationary and speciﬁc component plus a nonstationary com-
mon trend. Therefore, if pt and st are not cointegrated, both variables are
determined by diﬀerent nonstationary process. In this case, equation (15) im-
plies not only that x is nonzero but it is nonstationary. If both pt and st are
stationary or cointegrated, it is not possible to assert anything about land use
since the possibility of xt being nonzero but stationary cannot be ruled out.
[Insert Table 3]
Table 3 presents the results of cointegration tests for meadows and cropland
for each Brazilian region and for the whole country. All tests were carried out
using Jonhansen’s approach, assuming two lags for the VAR in levels. Consid-
ering the whole country, the results suggest the existence of a nonagricultural
component of land demand for meadows. Land prices for sale and rental rates
are cointegrated for Brazilian cropland. One possible explanation for this fact
is that cattle farms are easier to manage than crop farms. Therefore, indi-
viduals demanding land for nonagricultural purposes choose to buy meadows
because they oﬀer an easier way to obtain additional agricultural payoﬀs.
17The results of table 3 also indicate an interesting diﬀerence between the
Central-West region and the rest of the country. 13 Regions Northeast, South-
east and South present the same pattern of the country as a whole. On the
other hand, it seems that the nonagricultural motive of landholding for the
Central-West region regards cropland. This region is characterized by the exis-
tence of large tracts of land used for the production of agricultural commodities
for exportation, cultivated by capital intensive methods. The opportunity cost
of keeping idle those plots compensates the agency costs related to the labor
force.
3.4 The present value approach
This section uses the methodology of Campbell and Shiller (1987) to test
whether land prices are deﬁned by expected present value of future agricultural
rents. In order to present this methodology, consider the conventional present






where st is the land rental rate, δ ∈ [0,1] is a (constant) discount factor, and Et
denotes mathematical expectation, conditional on the full public information
set It.
The strategy applied here consists in a battery of tests to evaluate the validity
of (16). The analysis consider a new variable St ≡ pt − δ
1−δst, refered as the
spread and deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the land price and a multiple of
the rental rate. Note that if Etst+i = st for all i>0 then St =0 .E q u a t i o n













Equations (17) and (18) say that the spread St is a weighted average of future
changes in the rental rate st or it is linear in the optimal forecast of the change
in the land value pt.
13 Results for the North region are not analyzed because both series are stationary.
Thus, our test does not apply.
14 A general formulation also includes a constant term, which was omitted for to
simplify notation (see Campbell and Shiller, 1987).
18The ﬁrst step in the Campbell and Shiller (1987) methodology is the esti-
mation of δ. One possibility is to estimate δ from the regression of pt on a
constant plus st.I fEtst+i = st, equation (16) implies that the coeﬃcient on
st is δ/(1 − δ).
[Insert Table 4]
The test 1 presented in table 4 is based on equation (18). The present value
model determines that, if one regress ∆pt on St−1 and other variables, the coef-
ﬁcient on St−1 should be (1 − δ)/δ,a n dt h ec o e ﬃcients on the other variables
should be zero. The other variables considered were the dummies related to
the launching of stabilization plans in the current and previous period. table 4
reports two versions of tests - one with the joint test and another considering
only the test on the coeﬃcient of St−1. Both types reject the validity of (18)
for meadows and cropland in each Brazilian region and for the country as a
whole.
T h et e s t2i nt a b l e4c o n s i s t si nas e to fu n i tr o o tt e s t s .I f∆st is stationary, it
follows from (17) that St is stationary; (18) then implies that ∆pt is stationary.
Except for the cases of meadows in Northeast and South, all results depicted
in table 4 do not reject these implications. Thus, St and ∆st (or the pair St
and ∆pt) can be used as stationary variables that summarize the bivariate
history of st and pt.

































where a(L), b(L), c(L) and d(L) are polynomial in the lag operator, all
of order p.T h en u m b e ro fl a g sp for each system was chosen by the Akaike
information criterion (AIC), and they are presented in the ﬁrst column of table
5. table 5 also shows two diﬀerent implications of the present value relation
for the VAR system.
[Insert Table 5]
A weak implication of (17) is that St must linearly Granger-cause ∆st.A s
shown by test 3 in table 5, this condition is rejected in the regions North and
Northeast, as long as for cropland in Southeast and meadows in South. There
is strong evidence that spreads Granger-cause land rental rates for Brazilian
meadows, Central West, Southeastern meadows and Southern cropland.
The conditions analyzed above are derived as necessary conditions for the
expected value theory represented by (16). The full set of restrictions, however,
19is more demanding. Campbell and Shiller (1987) show that the constraints
















The formal tests of the theory are presented in table 5 as test 4. The null
hypotheses are rejected very strongly by Wald tests, indicating that the present
value formula does not hold for the samples. All p-values are much lower
than 0.001. In fact, ﬁgure 4 shows that the actual spread does not seem to
move closely to the theoretical spread. As shown by Falk (1991), both series
are negatively correlated, 15 i.e., land prices tend to be unusually high (with
respect to the present value theory) when the present values of expected future
changes in rents are unusually low.
[Insert Figure 4]
4C o n c l u s i o n
Latin American countries have a long history of land reforms and some au-
thors have recognized that land is those countries is not only an agricultural
input but also a source of other beneﬁt s .T h i sp a p e rh a sa n a l y z e dt h ei m p l i -
cations of nonagricultural land use to agrarian development, providing some
predictions regarding the role and the design of land reform programs. It was
argued that unskilled farmers, who cannot undertake agricultural production,
might be obligated to keep their land unimproved if the land-rental market
does not work perfectly. Poor skilled farmers, on the other hand, cannot buy
t h o s el a n d sb e c a u s et h el a n dp r i c ei sa b o v et h ee x p e c t e dp r e s e n tv a l u eo ft h e
agricultural proﬁts. Therefore, imperfections in the land-rental market coupled
with nonagricultural motives for landholding produce an ineﬃcient allocation
of resources.
The policy implications for the design of land reform programs in Latin Amer-
ica, besides the importance of enhancing the land-rental market, rely on two
main issues. The ﬁrst one comes from countervailing general equilibrium re-
sponses from prices (land price and wage rate) and occupational choices. An
15 The correlation among actual and theoretical spreads is -0.44 for cropland and
-0.78 for meadows and pastures.
20increase in the wage rates after reform might oﬀset initial gains from the re-
form if the beneﬁciaries decide to become laborers. This is less likely to occur
in a low-wage economy, as shown by the model. The second issue is related to
the information on farmer’s ability contained in the observation of the farm
size. The model suggests that those unskilled peasants who cannot manage
agricultural production decide to buy farms only above a certain critical size,
because their earnings are solely nonagricultural. Skilled farmers, on the other
hand, are willing to become landowners of smaller farms, because they can
get both agricultural and nonagricultural payoﬀs from land. This simple self-
selection argument means that small farmers are predominantly skilled when
compared with landless peasants or large landholders, which helps to solve
the important question of targeting in the implementation of land reform pro-
grams. Therefore, the model suggest that such programs should aim at small
farmers instead of landless people in order to enhance eﬃciency.
The model have also deﬁned an empirical strategy to test its main hypothesis.
Evidence based on land prices and land-rental rates from Brazil does not reject
the existence of this nonagricultural component of land demand. The launch-
ing of economic plans during the 1980s and 1990s increased the uncertainty of
the economy and raised land prices in more than 30%. This ﬁrst result was in-
terpreted as an evidence of the existence of the nonagricultural component of
land demand, since the eﬀect on land-rental rates were less important. Cointe-
gration analysis of land prices and rental rates reveals that this phenomenon,
except for the Central West region, occurs mostly for meadows and pastures -
land prices and rental rates of cropland present a common trend. The formal
tests of the present value model have strongly rejected that null hypothesis
that land prices can be written as the discounted value of future agricultural
rents. Therefore, the policy implications of the theoretical model seem to hold
in the Brazilian case - an interesting and signiﬁcant case study for land reform.
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Theoretical S (meadows) Actual S (meadows)
  
Table 1– Summary statistics for detrended land prices – Brazil – 1966-2000 
 Meadows  Cropland 
Statistics  rental sale rental sale 
Number  of  observations  69 69 69 69 
Mean  121.32 1616.10 197.40 2786.73 
Median  117.61 1580.95 193.50 2723.70 
Maximum  212.09 4952.82 270.46 8045.96 
Minimum 84.69  574.53  144.39  1267.43 
Standard  deviation  18.97 538.65 22.50 844.11 
Coefficient  of  variation 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.30 
Skewness  1.85 3.39 0.77 3.51 
Kurtosis  9.82 22.88 4.75 23.39 
Source: Getúlio Vargas Foudation – IBRE 
Note: all series were detrended and centered on the original mean. Since the original time series were nonstationary, 
we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend them in order to compute meaningful statistics. 
 
Table 2 – Effects of Economic Plans on Land Prices 
 Meadows  Cropland 
Estimates  Sale Rental Sale Rental 








(B) Dummy variable: new 









(B) / (A)  38.9%  20.3% 33.2%  5.7% 
(C) Dummy variable: new 









(C) / (A)  48.2%  16.2% 41.4%  1.5% 
R
2  0.17 0.14 0.15 0.02 
Note: all series were detrended and centered on the original mean. Since the original time series were nonstationary, 
we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to detrend them in order to compute meaningful statistics. All p-values are in pa-
rentheses.Table 3 – Cointegration Tests 
Likelihood ratio test  # cointegration  Regions Land  Type 
h = 0  h = 1  relations 
Cropland  19.55 3.46  1**  Brazil 
Meadows  13.37 1.71  0 
Cropland  20.15 8.90  Both  stationary  North 
Meadows  21.52 6.93  Both  stationary 
Cropland  17.84 6.64  1**  Northeast 
Meadows  12.61 3.44  0 
Cropland  15.12 1.09  0  Central-West 
Meadows  15.51 2.60  1** 
Cropland  31.85 8.96  Sales  stationary  Southeast 
Meadows  14.89 3.06  0 
Cropland  19.84 4.59  1**  South 
Meadows  15.10 4.84  0 
1% (*)  20.04 6.65    Critical Values 
5% (**)  15.41 3.76   
Note: tests were carried out using Johansen’s approach assuming 2 lags for the VAR in levels. 
Table 4 – Tests of the Present Value Formula I 
  Test 1
(a):  
t t t t x S p ε β α + + = ∆ −1  
Test 2
(b): Unit Root Tests
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Note: (a) Columns report the p-values of Wald tests considering chi-square distribution. (b) Test statistics for variable 
t X  are based on the t-statistics on α  in the regression
1 − + + = ∆ t t X t X α β µ .  The t-statistic is corrected for serial corre-
lation in the equation residual following the Phillips-Perron procedure. Significance levels are: (*) 10%, -3.17; (**) 5%, 
-3.48; (***) 1%, -4.10. Table 5 – Tests of the Present Value Formula II 
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Note: (c) The number of lags is chosen by the Akaike information criterion (AIC). 
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